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Executive Summary 
 
The Argentine economy has grown 94 percent for the years 2002-2011, using International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) projections for the end of this year. This is the fastest growth in the Western 
Hemisphere for this period, and among the highest growth rates in the world. It also compares 
favorably to neighboring economies that are commonly seen as quite successful, such as Brazil, 
which has had less than half as much growth over the same period. 
 
Argentina was trapped in a severe recession from mid-1998 to the end of 2001. Attempts to stabilize 
the economy and maintain the currency peg to the U.S. dollar, through monetary and fiscal 
tightening, led by the IMF and backed by tens of billions of dollars in lending, failed to arrest the 
economy’s downward spiral. 
 
In December of 2001, the government defaulted on its debt, and a few weeks later it abandoned the 
currency peg to the dollar.  The default and devaluation contributed to a severe financial crisis and a 
sharp economic contraction, with GDP shrinking by about 5 percent in the first quarter of 2002. 
However, recovery began after that one quarter of contraction, and continued until the world 
economic slowdown and recession of 2008-2009.  The economy then rebounded, and the IMF now 
projects growth of 8 percent for 2011. 
 
Argentina’s real GDP reached its pre-recession level after three years of growth, in the first quarter 
of 2005. Looking at twenty-year trend growth, it reached its trend GDP in the first quarter of 2007. 
 
The country experienced this remarkable economic growth despite the default and difficulties 
borrowing from international financial markets over the past nine years, and relatively little Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).This should give pause to those who argue, as is quite common in the 
business press, that pursuing policies that please bond markets and international investors, as well as 
attracting FDI should be the most important policy priorities for any developing country 
government. 
 
Argentina’s rapid growth has often been dismissed as a “commodity boom” driven by high prices 
for its agricultural exports such as soybeans, but the data show that this is not true. 
 
Poverty has fallen by over two-thirds from its peak, from almost half of the population in 2001 to 
approximately one-seventh of the population in early 2010.  Extreme poverty has fallen by about the 
same rate, from over one-fourth of the population in 2001 to approximately one in fifteen. 
 
Income inequality has also fallen dramatically.  In 2001, those in the 95th percentile had 32 times the 
income of those in the 5th percentile.  By early 2010, this fell by nearly half, to 17.  Perhaps more 
importantly, this change is due in large part to improving incomes among the poor and not just 
diminishing incomes among the rich. 
   
Unemployment has fallen by over half from its peak, to 8.0 percent. And employment, by early 
2010, had risen to 55.7 percent, the highest on record. 
 
Social spending nearly tripled in real terms, and rose from 10.3 to 14.2 percent of GDP. In 2009, the 
government expanded the reach of its social programs, launching the “Universal Allocation per 
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Child” (Asignación Universal por Hijo) with the goal of reducing poverty and improving the welfare of 
children. This was a conditional cash transfer program for low-income households, similar to 
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades programs, which have won widespread 
international praise, but is significantly larger relative to GDP.  
 
There were also significant reductions in infant and child mortality over the last nine years, 
somewhat more than in similarly situated countries. 
 
Inflation has risen sharply since 2007, peaking most recently at 27 percent at the beginning of 2011 – 
according to non-official sources -- before beginning to decline somewhat again. This is a problem 
for the economy, but it is real income growth, employment, and income distribution that matter 
with regard to the well-being of the vast majority of the population. By these measures, as we have 
seen above, the government appears to have made the correct decision not to fight inflation by 
sacrificing economic growth. To take one important historical example, South Korea registered 
annual rates of inflation similar to those of Argentina in recent years, in the 1970s and early 80s, 
while it traversed the journey from a poor to a high income country. 
 
However, inflation at this level can affect growth and employment through the exchange rate. If the 
nominal exchange rate is fixed or does not depreciate sufficiently in response to the inflation, then 
the domestic currency becomes increasingly overvalued in real terms. The peso has appreciated 
about 20 percent in real terms since 2007. 
 
It is remarkable that Argentina has achieved its success in the face of adverse external circumstances, 
some of which continue to this day.  Just one month ago the Obama administration, under pressure 
from “vulture funds” and their associated lobby groups, announced that it would oppose multilateral 
loans to Argentina. 
 
Argentina’s success has important implications for Europe, including the weaker eurozone 
economies. 
 
Greece, which has been pursuing policies similar to those adopted by Argentina during its 1998-
2002 recession, is expected to need more than 9 years to reach its pre-crisis level of GDP.  
Unemployment, which is currently at 16 percent, could take even longer to reach normal levels. 
Trend level GDP is nowhere in sight. 
 
The situation of the other weaker eurozone economies is similarly bleak. The attempt to adjust 
through “internal devaluation” in Europe is proving to be as much a disaster there as it was for 
Argentina in its deep 1998-2002 recession.   
 
From the point of view of any of the individual governments that are being subjected to this 
process, the Argentine solution involving a default large enough to reduce the country’s debt burden 
to a manageable level would have to be considered as a possible alternative. For Greece at this point, 
for example, this could very possibly be preferable to its current trajectory, even if it were to involve 
leaving the euro. 
 
Argentina’s experience also calls into question the popular myth that recessions caused by financial 
crises must involve a slow and painful recovery. Argentina’s financial crisis and collapse were as 
severe as that of almost any country in recent decades; and yet it took only one quarter after the 
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default to embark on a rapid and sustained recovery. This is not only because of the devaluation and 
improved macroeconomic policies, but because the default freed the country from having to be 
continually hamstrung by a crippling debt burden and by pro-cyclical policies imposed by creditors. 
The Argentine government has shown that Europe’s bleak current situation and projected scenario 
is just one possible outcome, and that a rapid recovery in output, employment, poverty reduction, 
and reduced inequality is another very feasible path that can be chosen. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is striking that Argentina’s economic growth over the last nine years has been given so little 
positive attention.  China’s success as the fastest-growing economy in world history has been widely 
recognized, even if the Chinese government is often criticized in the Western press for its trade and 
currency policies.  India’s rapid growth since 2003 (averaging 8.9 percent annually from 2003-2008) 
has also attracted much praise. But Argentina has not generally been seen as successful. Much of the 
press reporting has been negative, focusing on the high inflation of recent years. 
But it is real income that matters in terms of living standards, and the Argentine economy has grown 
94 percent for the years 2002-2011, using IMF projections for the end of this year. This is the fastest 
growth in the Western Hemisphere for this period, and among the highest growth rates in the world. 
It also compares favorably to neighboring economies that are commonly seen as quite successful, 
such as Brazil, which has had less than half as much growth over the same period. It should 
therefore be of interest to policy-makers and economists. 
As will be seen below, the Argentine story also has implications for macroeconomic policy in other 
countries, and particularly for countries such as Greece, and perhaps some of the other, weaker 
eurozone economies that are currently pursuing pro-cyclical policies in an attempt to reduce high 
and in some cases unsustainable debt burdens.  Perhaps even more importantly, it has significant 
implications for a currently widely held view1 that recovery from recessions caused by financial crises 
must necessarily take much longer than recovery from other types of recessions. 
Argentina’s deep recession from 1998-2002 was one of the very worst, in terms of lost output, of 
the past hundred years; and it was clearly caused by a financial crisis that culminated in a systemic 
financial collapse. Yet the recovery was very rapid. 
This paper presents a brief overview of Argentina’s recent economic performance. 
Recession, Default and Recovery 
 
Argentina was trapped in a severe recession from mid-1998 to the end of 2001. Attempts to stabilize 
the economy and maintain the currency peg to the U.S. dollar, through monetary and fiscal 
tightening, led by the IMF and backed by tens of billions of dollars in lending, failed to arrest the 
economy’s downward spiral. 
 
                                                 
1 This view has been promoted most successfully by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and is widely accepted in the financial 
press. 
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In December of 2001, the government defaulted on its debt, and a few weeks later it abandoned the 
currency peg to the dollar.  The default and devaluation contributed to a severe financial crisis and a 
sharp economic contraction, with GDP shrinking by about 5 percent in the first quarter of 2002. 
However, recovery began after that one quarter of contraction, and continued until the world 
economic slowdown and recession of 2008-2009.  The economy shrank by 0.9 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, and by the same amount in the first quarter of 2009.  But it rebounded quickly and 
grew by an annualized rate of 8.6 percent over the next 10 quarters (to the second quarter of 2011).2 
The IMF projects growth of 8 percent for 2011. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, Argentina’s real GDP reached its pre-recession level after three years 
of growth, in the first quarter of 2005. Looking at twenty-year trend growth, it reached its trend 
GDP in the first quarter of 2007. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Real GDP: Actual and 20-Year Trend (Seasonally-Adjusted) 
 
 
Source: INDEC 2011a, IMF 2011b and Authors’ Calculations. 
                                                 
2 Non-government estimates of real GDP hold that the 2008-2009 recession was deeper, and the recovery slower, than 
what is suggested by official sources.  See Frenkel (Forthcoming). However, the IMF notes that “the difference 
between private and official estimates of real GDP growth has narrowed in 2010.” 
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It is worth noting that this recovery and growth was achieved without help from international 
lending institutions. In fact, the opposite took place: in 2002, the first year3 of the recovery, the IFI’s 
(international financial institutions) took a net 4 percent of GDP out of the Argentine economy. The 
IMF also pressured the Argentine government to pay more to the defaulted external creditors; 
recommended tighter fiscal policy in order to achieve the goal of paying more to creditors; and 
opposed a number of other policies that were helpful to economic recovery and/or were designed 
to alleviate the burden of the crisis on distressed sectors of the population.4 
 
As a result of the default, and the refusal of a minority of creditors to accept the eventual 
restructuring agreement in 2005, and subsequent legal action by these creditors and “vulture funds,” 
Argentina has faced difficulties borrowing in international financial markets over the last nine years.  
Since it has not been able to settle its debt with the government creditors of the Paris Club, it has 
also been denied some export credits.  FDI has remained limited, averaging about 1.7 percent of 
GDP over the past eight years, with a number of serious legal actions taken by investors against the 
government. 
 
Yet in spite of all of these adverse external conditions that Argentina faced during the past nine 
years, the country experienced this remarkable economic growth. This should give pause to those 
who argue, as is quite common in the business press, that pursuing policies that please bond markets 
and international investors, as well as attracting FDI, should be the most important policy priorities 
for any developing country government. While FDI can clearly play an important role in promoting 
growth through a variety of mechanisms, and foreign capital in general can, in some circumstances, 
boost growth by supplementing domestic savings, Argentina’s success suggests that these capital 
inflows are not necessarily as essential as is commonly believed. And it also suggests that 
macroeconomic policy may be more important that is generally recognized.   
 
Exports and Contributions to Growth 
 
As noted above, Argentina reached its pre-recession level of GDP after three years of growth; so the 
rapid growth that has continued since 2005 cannot be attributed to a simple rebound from 
recession. (Although the initial recovery was by no means easy or assured, as can be seen by the slow 
recovery of many countries today from the 2008-2009 financial crisis and recession, as well as the 
history of Argentina’s initial recovery.)5  Argentina’s rapid growth has often been dismissed as a 
“commodity boom” driven by high prices for its agricultural exports such as soybeans, but this is 
not true. 
 
Table 1 shows the real contributions to GDP growth by expenditure. It can be seen that the role of 
exports is not very large during the expansion of 2002-2008. It peaks at 1.8 percentage points of 
GDP in 2005 and 2010, and amounts to a cumulative 7.6 percentage points, or about 12 percent of 
the growth during the expansion.  The story for net exports is even worse, with net exports (exports 
minus imports) showing a negative cumulative contribution over the period. The recovery is driven 
                                                 
3 The annual data show a decline of 11 percent in Argentine GDP for 2002. However, this is measured by taking the 
average GDP for 2002 and dividing by the average for 2001; as noted above, the Argentine economy actually started 
growing in the second quarter of 2002. 
4 For more detail in the IMF’s role during the recovery, see Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007). 
5 See Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007) and Frenkel and Rapetti (2007) for more detail. 
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by consumption and investment (fixed capital formation), which account for 45.4 and 26.4 
percentage points of growth, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Argentina: Real GDP Growth, Contributions from Expense Categories (Percentage Points) 
 Contributions from Each Expense Category Total 
GDP 
Growth  
Private 
Consumption 
Government 
Consumption 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
Exports Imports 
Change in 
Inventories and 
Stat. Discrep. 
1998 2.4 0.4 1.3 1.1 -1.1 -0.3 3.9 
1999 -1.4 0.3 -2.7 -0.1 1.5 -1.1 -3.4 
2000 -0.5 0.1 -1.3 0.3 0.0 0.6 -0.8 
2001 -4.0 -0.3 -2.8 0.3 1.7 0.6 -4.4 
2002 -9.9 -0.7 -5.8 0.4 5.6 -0.6 -10.9 
2003 5.4 0.2 4.3 0.8 -2.4 0.5 8.8 
2004 6.2 0.4 4.9 1.1 -3.2 -0.4 9.0 
2005 5.9 0.8 4.0 1.8 -2.1 -1.3 9.2 
2006 5.1 0.6 3.6 1.0 -1.7 -0.2 8.5 
2007 5.9 0.9 2.9 1.3 -2.5 0.1 8.7 
2008 4.3 0.8 2.1 0.2 -1.9 1.3 6.8 
2009 0.3 0.9 -2.4 -0.9 2.7 0.2 0.9 
2010 5.9 1.2 4.4 1.8 -3.9 -0.2 9.2 
Source: INDEC (2011b). 
 
 
However, this measure of real (inflation-adjusted) contributions to growth does not measure the full 
impact of exports when there are significant price increases for exports. In this case, if the price 
increase is large enough and the affected exports are a big enough share of the economy, the 
increased income can contribute to growth and to living standards (through the consumption of 
imports that do not add directly to GDP) in other ways, that do not show up in the real 
contributions to GDP growth measured above. 
 
To consider these other effects of the rising value of exports, Figures 2 and 3 show Argentina’s 
annual exports by value, and by category; this is shown both in current dollars and below, in percent 
of GDP. 
 
As can be seen in the graphs, exports as a percent of GDP, as measured by dollar value, actually 
decreased during the recovery.  And agricultural exports, as a percent of GDP, fell slightly from 5.0 
percent of GDP to 4.7 percent, dipping as low as 3.4 percent in 2006 – again, this is measured by 
dollar value, so it reflects the large increases in commodity prices from  2005 to 2008.  So 
agricultural exports are clearly not driving growth; and in fact they are too small a share of GDP to 
have anywhere near the kind of impact that is often attributed to them.6 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This is true even if we include some of the manufactured goods (e.g. soybean oil ), which are linked to commodity 
prices. These are also shown in Figure 2.  These are flat over the expansion in terms of dollar value as a percent of 
GDP.   
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FIGURE 2 
Argentina: Export Value by Category and Value, in US Dollars 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Argentina: Export Value by Category and Value, in Percent of GDP 
 
Note: Other manufacturing includes textile, wood and paper products.   
Source: CEPAL (2011). 
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Social Indicators 
Poverty	
 
As Figure 4 shows, poverty has fallen by over two-thirds from its peak, from almost half of the 
population in 2001 to approximately one-seventh of the population in early 2010.  Extreme poverty 
has fallen by about the same rate, from over one-fourth of the population in 2001 to approximately 
one in fifteen.  In both cases, the rates have fallen to about their level in the early 1990s.7 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Argentina: Poverty and Extreme Poverty, Percent of Individuals
 
Source: CEDLAS and the World Bank (2011) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Income Inequality	
 
As Figure 5 shows, income inequality has also fallen dramatically.  In 2001, those in the 95th 
percentile had 32 times the income of those in the 5th percentile.  By early 2010, this fell by nearly 
half, to 17.  Perhaps more importantly, this change is due in large part to improving incomes among 
the poor and not just diminishing incomes among the rich.  As the tan bars show, since 2006 
changes in the lower half of the income spectrum account for the majority of the improvement. 
 
 
                                                 
7  Figures 4 through 6 use the most recent data available, published through CEDLAS and the World Bank (2011).   
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FIGURE 5 
Argentina: Inequality, Income Ratio of 95th Percentile to 5th Percentile 
 
Source: CEDLAS and the World Bank (2011). 
 
Labor Market 
 
Whereas poverty had one clear, dramatic peak in 2002, the labor market saw two distinct years of 
difficulty: 1996 and 2001.  As Figure 6 shows, between 1992 and 1996, unemployment rose by over 
150 percent, from 6.8 to 17.7 percent.  It declined again to 12.5 percent in 1998, but within three 
years had risen to a record of 18.4 percent.  Since then, it has fallen by over half, to 8.0 percent. 
 
Employment showed a similar pattern, with the notable exception that its recent levels are even 
higher than its 1992 levels.  Employment fell from 52 percent in 1992 to under half in 1997, briefly 
rose again to over 50 percent in 1998 and fell back to 46 percent in 2001.  By early 2010, it had risen 
to 55.7 percent, the highest on record.  This is not only because of women joining the labor force; 
men’s employment is also above its 1992 level, at 87.7 percent.   
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FIGURE 6  
Argentina: Employment and Unemployment 
 
Source: CEDLAS and the World Bank (2011). 
 
 
Social Spending and Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programs 
 
The Argentine government presided over a huge increase in its social spending, as well as revenue, 
as a percent of GDP. Revenue increased from 15 percent of GDP in 2002 to 23.4 percent in 2009.  
Since the economy was growing rapidly through most of this time, this represents quite a large 
increase in revenue – it roughly tripled in real terms during this period. The vast bulk of this increase 
was not from the first few years of economic recovery but has occurred since 2005, after the 
economy had already reached its pre-recession level. 
 
Spending on Social Security increased from 5.5 to 7.5 percent of GDP.  The government also 
increased support to various sectors of the economy, from just 0.43 percent of GDP to 4.1 percent. 
 
Like revenue, social spending nearly tripled in real terms, and rose from 10.3 to 14.2 percent of 
GDP. It began as a response to the deep recession and its lagged effects in 2002 and 2003. One 
program provided a monthly stipend (150 pesos) to heads of households who were unemployed 
with children of up to 18 years-old (or disabled of any age), and to those where the head of the 
household was ill. At its height in 2003, the program reached 20 percent of all households, with 97.6 
percent of its beneficiaries under the poverty line. 
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In 2009, the government expanded the reach of its social programs, launching the “Universal 
Allocation per Child” (Asignación Universal por Hijo) with the goal of reducing poverty and improving 
the welfare of children. This was a conditional cash transfer program for low-income households, 
similar to Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades programs, which have won 
widespread international praise, but is significantly larger relative to GDP. Spending on the 
Universal Allocation per Child program has reached 0.6 percent of GDP in 2011, as compared with 
0.4 percent of GDP for Mexico and Brazil.8 It is too early to say how much these programs have 
reduced poverty, but when the effect is measured it is almost certain to be quite large.   
 
 
Health 
 
Argentina’s health indicators have improved, not only over the past 9 years but also over the past 20 
years; but to evaluate the recent progress, we need to compare it to the performance of similarly 
situated countries.  To do that, the figures below compare Argentina’s 1990-2010 progress to that of 
other upper-middle income countries,9 starting at the year they reached Argentina’s 1990 level.  In 
other words, these figures answer the question: what is normal progress for a country like Argentina, 
starting from where it was in 1990?  We look at child and infant health here, as adult health depends 
on changes over a much longer period of time than the focus of this analysis. 
 
Figure 7 shows progress in infant mortality, which has fallen by approximately half in Argentina 
since 1990, from 26.9 to 13.8 deaths per 1,000 live births.  However, for the first decade after 1990, 
Argentina’s progress was significantly slower than that of its peers.  By 2000, infant mortality was 14 
percent higher in Argentina than in its peer countries: 17.5 compared to 15.3 deaths per 1,000 live 
births.  Beginning in 2001, Argentina began slowly closing this performance gap, and by 2010 it had 
essentially eliminated it, shrinking it to 0.6 deaths per 1000 live births, about the same as it was in 
1990.10 
 
Argentina’s relative progress shows much the same story in child mortality.  Though it has roughly 
halved its child mortality since 1990, for the first decade its progress was much slower than that of 
its peers (see Figure 8).  By 2000, child mortality was 10 percent higher in Argentina than in its peer 
countries: 19.6 compared to 17.8 deaths per 1,000 children under age five.  As with infant mortality, 
this performance gap slowly narrowed in the next 10 years, until Argentina actually surpassed its 
peer countries in 2010, continuing to make progress while its peer countries on average saw a 
slowdown in progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate Fome (2011) and Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades 
(2011).  
9 Using the IMF’s income groups. 
10 In their first year of lowering infant mortality to 23.8 or lower, it is much more likely for rates to be slightly below 
23.8 than to be exactly 23.8.  Thus, the gap does not begin at zero. 
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FIGURE 7 
Argentina: Infant Mortality, with Comparison to Similar Countries 
 
Note: The similar countries represent a cohort of peers for Argentina. Their progress was averaged every year beginning with the 
first year their infant mortality rates dropped below 23.8. See Weisbrot and Ray (2001) for a detailed explanation of a similar 
methodology. Source: World Bank (2011) and authors’ calculations. 
 
FIGURE 8 
Argentina: Child Mortality, with Comparison to Similar Countries 
 
Note: The similar countries represent a cohort of peers for Argentina. Their progress was averaged every year beginning with the 
first year their child mortality rates dropped below 26.9. See Weisbrot and Ray (2001) for a detailed explanation of a similar 
methodology. Source: World Bank (2011) and authors’ calculations. 
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Inflation and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
Figure 9 shows inflation as measured by the CPI (Consumer Price Index) from INDEC (the 
National Institute of Statistics and Surveys), which is the main official government data; and the 
CPI-7, as measured by CENDA (an independent Argentine think tank). Many private economists 
believe that inflation is considerably higher than the CPI; private estimates are closer to the CENDA 
measure. The CPI-7 measures inflation by looking at the change in consumer prices in seven 
different provinces while the official CPI only measures prices in the Greater Buenos Aires area.  
We have included both estimates here. 
 
Argentina’s inflation is one of the main emphases of most press reporting on the economy. It is 
often noted that – according to the CPI-7 and private estimates – Argentina has had one of the 
highest inflation rates in the hemisphere in recent years.  Inflation quickly retreated from the brief 
spike brought on by the devaluation in 2002; but there was another jump in 2007-2008 that brought 
inflation to 31 percent.  It retreated considerably as the country slid toward recession in 2009, to 
13.2 percent.  It then peaked again at 27 percent at the beginning of 2011, before beginning to 
decline somewhat again. 
 
 
FIGURE 9 
Inflation: Official and Independent Measures 
 
Sources: INDEC (2011) and CENDA (2011).  
Note: As measured by the CPI from INDEC, and CPI-7 as measured by CENDA. 
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Inflation may be too high in Argentina, but it is real growth and income distribution that matter with 
regard to the well-being of the vast majority of the population. By these measures, as we have seen 
above, the government appears to have made the correct decision not to fight inflation by sacrificing 
economic growth. . To take one important historical example, South Korea registered annual rates 
of inflation similar to those of Argentina in recent years, in the 1970s and early 80s, while it 
traversed the journey from a poor to a high income country. 
 
However, inflation at this level can affect growth and employment through the exchange rate. If the 
nominal exchange rate is fixed or does not depreciate sufficiently in response to the inflation, then 
the domestic currency becomes increasingly overvalued in real terms. This happens each year that 
Argentina has inflation higher than its trading partners, and the peso does not depreciate enough to 
make up for the difference between domestic and foreign inflation rates. 
 
Figure 10 shows Argentina’s Real Effective Exchange Rate. The peso fell sharply11 in response to 
the devaluation. Then there was a correction for “overshooting,” and the peso appreciated 
somewhat, remaining fairly steady until 2007. Then it appreciated significantly in real terms relative 
to its trading partners, by about 19.8 percent. If inflation continues at current levels, it will be 
difficult for the government to carry out its policy of targeting a stable and competitive real 
exchange rate, and that could hurt the economy by making exports and import-competing industries 
less competitive. 
 
FIGURE 10  
Argentina’s Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 
Source: Frenkel (Forthcoming).  
                                                 
11 Since it is the cost of the dollar (or foreign currency) in terms of pesos is being measured in the graph, the jump 
corresponds to a depreciation of the peso. 
0
0,4
0,8
1,2
1,6
2
2,4
2,8
3,2
19
86
Q
1
19
87
Q
1
19
88
Q
1
19
89
Q
1
19
90
Q
1
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
1
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
1
19
95
Q
1
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
1
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
00
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
08
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
10
Q
1
CEPR The Argentine Success Story and its Implications z 15
 
  
Policy Implications of Argentina’s Experience 
 
Argentina’s economic policies have proven, over the last 9 years, to be very successful by a host of 
measures examined above. It is remarkable that this has been achieved in the face of adverse 
external circumstances, some of which continue to this day.  Just one month ago the Obama 
administration, under pressure from “vulture funds” and their associated lobby groups,12 announced 
that it would oppose multilateral loans to Argentina. 
 
The success of Argentina’s macroeconomic policies, including the central bank’s targeting of a stable 
and competitive real exchange rate and its reluctance to sacrifice economic growth in order to hold 
inflation to a particular target, deserve more attention than they have gotten. But perhaps the most 
important implications of Argentina’s story over the past nine years are for Europe, including the 
weaker eurozone economies. 
 
Figures A1 through A5 show (see the Appendix) the IMF’s latest projections for the weaker 
eurozone economies. Greece, which has been pursuing policies similar to those adopted by 
Argentina during its 1998-2002 recession, is expected to need more than 9 years to reach its pre-
crisis level of GDP.  Unemployment, which is currently at 16 percent, could take even longer to 
reach normal levels. Trend level GDP is nowhere in sight. 
 
The situation of the other eurozone economies is similarly bleak, if not as terrible as that of Greece. 
None can foresee a return to trend-level GDP.  The number of years to reach pre-crisis GDP ranges 
from five for Spain to at least nine years for Ireland and Italy.  But these forecasts may turn out to 
be, as the projections of the last few years have been, overly-optimistic.13  Unemployment is 
currently 21 percent in Spain and shows no sign of dropping to normal levels in the near future. 
 
The attempt to adjust through “internal devaluation” in Europe is proving to be as much a disaster 
there as it was for Argentina in its deep 1998-2002 recession.  The biggest risk for Europe at present 
is that continued policy errors will push Italy down a similar road that Greece has followed. Greece’s 
debt-to-GDP ratio when it signed its first agreement with the IMF in May of last year was 115 
percent of GDP; it is expected to hit 190 percent of GDP next year. As can be seen in Figure A3, 
the IMF has already lowered Italy’s growth projections significantly over the past six months, 
because of the 54 billion euro austerity measures that the government has adopted under pressure 
from the European authorities or “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, 
ECB, and the IMF). This raises the prospect of Italy following the path of Greece, where deficit 
reduction targets get increasingly more difficult because of falling revenues, to which the authorities 
respond with further fiscal consolidation, and so on in a downward spiral of falling income and a 
rising risk premium and therefore higher interest rates on the country’s sovereign bonds. The whole 
regional economy has been thrown into a state of crisis and uncertainty which will likely not be 
resolved until the European authorities can find a way to guarantee Italian and Spanish bonds, or 
they move away from the failed, pro-cyclical policies that they have implemented. 
 
                                                 
12 Including most notably the American Task Force on Argentina (http://atfa.org/).  For more information on this 
topic, see Weisbrot (2009). 
13 See Weisbrot and Montecino (2010). 
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From the point of view of any of the individual governments that are being subjected to this 
process, the Argentine solution involving a default large enough to reduce the country’s debt burden 
to a manageable level would have to be considered as a possible alternative. For Greece at this point, 
for example, this could very possibly be preferable to its current trajectory, even if it were to involve 
leaving the euro. 
 
Argentina’s experience calls into question the popular myth, as noted above, that recessions caused 
by financial crises must involve a slow and painful recovery. Argentina’s financial crisis and collapse 
were as severe as that of almost any country in recent decades; and yet it took only one quarter after 
the default to embark on a rapid and sustained recovery. This is not only because of the devaluation 
and improved macroeconomic policies, but because the default freed the country from having to be 
continually hamstrung by a crippling debt burden and by pro-cyclical policies imposed by creditors. 
It is these types of policies, along with the ultra-conservatism of central banks like the present ECB, 
that mostly account for the historical experience of delayed recoveries after financial crises.  The 
Argentine government has shown that this bleak scenario is just one possible outcome, and that a 
rapid recovery in output, employment, poverty reduction, and reduced inequality is another very 
feasible path that can be chosen. 
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Appendix 
 
FIGURE A1 
Greece Real GDP: Actual, Projected and 20-Year Trend (Index:2008=100) 
 
 
FIGURE A2 
Ireland Real GDP: Actual, Projected and 20-Year Trend (Index:2007=100) 
 
Source: IMF and Authors’ Calculations. 
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FIGURE A3 
Italy Real GDP: Actual, Projected and 20-Year Trend (Index:2007=100) 
 
Source: IMF and Authors’ Calculations. 
 
FIGURE A4 
Portugal Real GDP: Actual, Projected and 20-Year Trend (Index:2008=100) 
 
Source: IMF and Authors’ Calculations. 
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FIGURE A5 
Spain Real GDP: Actual, Projected and 20-Year Trend (Index:2008=100) 
 
Source: IMF and Authors’ Calculations. 
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